Defense of meat eating

I do not consider myself morally obliged to be a vegetarian. I believe that the humane captivity and slaughter of non-human animals is morally permissible.¹

I believe that individual animals are not as morally significant as individual persons, even though they do share same the qualities that are the source of value for persons. There is intrinsic value in intentionality and consciousness. All living organisms are beautiful, and are subject to aesthetic morality. Without a doubt, there is normative force behind aesthetic morality. However, I believe that I have different types of moral duties towards persons with a much stronger normative force.

I have a moral contract with other persons to behave in a way that provides a sustainable and enjoyable future for all persons. Moral behavior allows for the cooperation between individuals that is necessary for family, community, and society to flourish. I feel obliged to enter this contract because I recognize that it makes possible all of my intentions, aspirations, and purposes in life. I could never harm another person, since it greatly undermines the contract and puts in danger nearly all of the things I value. Furthermore, I know that I am expected by other persons to uphold this contract, which gives me anticipation that other persons will fulfill their moral duties. This reciprocity encourages my moral commitment.

Non-human animals are not in this contract, since they do not have the capacity to cooperate and play an intentional role in the well being of society, and since they do not expect me to uphold any moral duties towards them. I do not feel obliged to treat them as I would other persons. Their moral status requires other considerations of my values. I recognize that animals have their own intentions and preferences, which I normally do not want to hinder or negate. In a sense, all living organisms have a type of intentionality. Furthermore, the difference between intentional systems and stable systems in general is not at all clear. There is a purpose to all systems, which is continued existence and well being. It is sometimes hard for me to understand why well being matters, especially when the system has nothing to do with my intents and purposes. Nevertheless, I usually feel morally compelled not to harm these systems without due reason.

I eat meat because it tastes good and because it is a good source of sustenance. It is entirely possible for me to choose vegetarian products in lieu of meat. It is rather inconvenient though, since I would consciously have to avoid the normal culinary habits among society and the influence of the commercial market on my purchases. These reasons move me to eat meat more than my convictions to ensure the continued existence of a non-human intentional being. I value their existence for the purpose of their sustenance and good flavor more than I value the purposes of their consciousness and intentionality. I know this sounds callous, and may even denigrate my moral character. Because of these preferences of values, I find it morally permissible to eat meat.

1Factory farming commits serious moral crimes against (human and non-human) animals and the environment on an epic scale. Since 99% of animal products consumed in the U.S. are raised on factory farms, it is certainly difficult to be a consciences omnivore.